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Abstract
Chebyshev polynomials have been recently proposed for designing public-key systems. In-
deed, they enjoy some nice chaotic properties, which seem to be suitable for use in Cryptography.
Moreover, they satisfy a semi-group property, which makes possible implementing a trapdoor
mechanism. In this paper we study a public key cryptosystem based on such polynomials, which
provides both encryption and digital signature. The cryptosystem works on real numbers and is
quite efficient. Unfortunately, from our analysis it comes up that it is not secure. We describe
an attack which permits to recover the corresponding plaintext from a given ciphertext. The
same attack can be applied to produce forgeries if the cryptosystem is used for signing messages.
Then, we point out that also other primitives, a Diffie-Hellman like key agreement scheme and
an authentication scheme, designed along the same lines of the cryptosystem, are not secure due
to the aforementioned attack. We close the paper by discussing the issues and the possibilities
of constructing public key cryptosystems on real numbers.
1 Introduction
Chaos and Cryptography. The study of chaotic systems and their possible applications to
Cryptography has received considerable attention during the last years in a part of the scientific
community. Chaotic systems are indeed characterized by sensitive dependence on initial conditions
and similarity to random behavior, properties which seem pretty much the same required by several
cryptographic primitives (see [20] for a brief overview).
In [17] for the first time a symmetric key cryptosystem based on Chaos Theory was presented in
a well-established cryptographic conference, but it was cryptoanalysed in the same conference [5].
Another scheme based on chaotic maps was broken in [3].
Since then Chaos Theory has not received much attention inside the cryptographic community.
However, it has had several applications in other communication areas and people involved in Chaos
Theory have been keeping working on the idea of using the properties of chaotic systems in designing
efficient cryptographic primitives.
Two main approaches to the use of chaotic systems in designing cryptographic systems can be
found in the literature. One of these approaches uses hardware-based synchronized chaotic circuits
[26] where, in order to encrypt messages, the cleartext is hidden in the spectral domain of the chaotic
signal. This method is strongly related to the concept of synchronization of two chaotic systems and
the interested reader can find a survey on the state of art in this field in [19].
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The other, still for encryption purposes, has investigated the simulation of chaotic discrete dy-
namical systems on a computer (see [12, 23, 35] to name few).
Many chaotic systems are defined over real numbers. On the other hand, Cryptography deals with
systems defined mostly on finite fields. This yields some immediate consequences. Some ordinary
design strategies and standard cryptanalytic methods cannot be applied to cryptosystems based on
chaotic systems working over real numbers. Just to exemplify, cryptographic systems have secret
parameters taking values over a large but finite field. Hence, a brute force attack, which simply
tries all elements of the field in searching the secret values might be infeasible but possible. If the
range of the parameters of a cryptosystem based on real numbers is a continous infinite interval, an
exaustive search is just impossible.
However, at the state of current knowledge, the security of chaos-based cryptosystems defined
over real numbers is not well understood.
Public Key Cryptography. Public Key Cryptography enables users who do not share any secret
key to securely communicate over a public channel. More precisely, in a public key cryptosystem
every user U has a pair of keys (pU , sU ). The key pU of user U is public and can be used by everybody
else to send an encrypted message to U . The key sU enables to decrypt messages encrypted with key
pU , and is kept secret by U . Hence, U is the only user able to decrypt encrypted messages. Roughly
speaking, the security of a public key cryptosystem, is based on the assumption that computing
the secret key sU given the public key one pU (even if theoretically possible) is computationally
infeasible.
From an historical point of view, Diffie and Hellman, with the publication in 1976 of their paper,
New Directions in Cryptography [13], introduced the idea1 of public key cryptography. Later on,
Rivest, Shamir and Adlemann, proposed the well-known RSA cryptosystem [30], which realized such
an idea. Since then many new cryptosystems have been proposed (see [28, 25] for some relevant
examples) and, in general, public key cryptography is a well-established and sound field of knowledge.
The Issue of Security. Two of the top concerns cryptographers have been dealing with since the
idea of public key cryptography was introduced are what a secure public key cryptosystem is and how
an efficient one can be constructed. The first received an answer by Goldwasser and Micali in [16],
where the notion of semantic security (w.r.t passive attacks) was established, and by Rackoff and
Simon [29], where adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks were considered. The adversary in the latter
powerful setting has access to the decryption algorithm and can obtain the plaintexts corresponding
to ciphertext messages of his own choosing (apart the challenge ciphertext he has to attack).
However, it turned out to be a difficult task to get an efficient cryptosystem, secure against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. Several proposals were given along the years. In 1998 Cramer
and Shoup [10] gave the first practical and secure public key encryption scheme. We refer the
interested reader to the journal version [11] of such a paper [10] for details about the cryptosystem
and for a brief hystorical excursus.
Standard Model and Random Oracle Model. The methodology usually applied in Cryp-
tography in order to show that a given protocol meets certain security requirements is reductionist:
assuming that for a well-known computational problem there are no efficient (i.e., probabilistic poly-
nomial time) algorithms, it is shown that an efficient algorithm breaking the security requirements
of the protocol can be used as a building block for constructing an efficient algorithm for solving the
supposed to be hard computational problem. In other words, the security of the protocol is reduced
to the presumed difficulty of a certain computational problem.
Several currently available public key cryptosystems are defined over finite fields and use modular
arithmetics. Their security is often based on the presumed difficulty of solving certain number
theoretic problems, like factoring large composite integers, computing the discrete logarithm in
1Even if recently it has been found out that at the GCHQ [18] the idea of public key had already been proposed
by the time Diffie and Hellman published their paper but kept secret due to military reasons, it is undoubtly that [13]
introduced such an idea into the scientific community
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finite multiplicative groups, deciding quadratic residuosity of an element, computing square roots
and so on. More precisely, two kinds of proofs of security have been given. The first one are proofs
in the so called standard model, where the security of the scheme is based on standard assumptions,
like the aforementioned ones.
The second deal with the so called random oracle model [2], where a sort of idealized model is
considered, and the scheme is proved secure in such a model. Then, it is argued that if in the real
world the idealized component (i.e., a random function) is opportunely instanciated (e.g., by means
of a concrete hash function) the scheme is secure. However, it has been shown that there are schemes
secure in the random oracle model but insecure in any implementation in the real world [6]. Hence,
the latter are also considered as “heuristic proofs” of security.
Empirical Analysis. Several well-known and widely used cryptosystems have not been proven
secure according to the reductionistic methodology. Formal proofs in the standard model or in the
random oracle model have not always been found. Such cryptosystems have been considered secure
when they have been used for a long time and no easy method for breaking them has been discovered.
Public-key schemes as dynamical system. Since 1976, numerous public-key algorithms have
been proposed; three most widely used public-key crypto-systems are: RSA, Rabin and ElGamal.
From a dynamical point of view, all three encryption algorithms, RSA, ElGamal, and Rabin, employ
one single system:
Xn+1 = (Xn)
p (mod N), (1)
where Xn is an integer, 0 ≤ Xn ≤ N − 1, and, X0, p and N are properly chosen integers. For
example, in the ElGamal public-key scheme, one uses (1), where N is a prime, X0 is a generator
of the multiplicative group Z∗N of integers modulo N , and 1 ≤ p ≤ N − 2. In the RSA algorithm,
N = PQ, where P and Q are two random distinct primes, p is an integer 1 < p < φ, where
φ = (P − 1)(Q− 1), such that gcd(p, φ) = 1, and X0 is the message to be encrypted. Rabin public-
key encryption scheme uses (1) with p = 2, N = PQ, where P and Q primes both congruent to
3(mod4), and X0 is the message to be encrypted. All three schemes use the the following property
of (1):
(Xp)q = Xpq (modN). (2)
Recently, several authors have suggested public-key encryption algorithms based on chaotic dynam-
ical systems, defined on real numbers, for which the property (2) is satisfied. Since in this paper we
only consider dynamical systems defined over real numbers and enjoying property (2), we refer the
reader to Section 2 of [24] for a brief overview on some previously proposed public key cryptosystems
based on different chaotic systems and for some more references to the subject.
K. Umeno was probably the first author who suggested that a rational map defined by the elliptic
function, which can be expressed directly by a rational polynomial [31], can be used in the public-
key scenario [32]. In [21] the authors proposed a public-key encryption algorithm and a signature
algorithm, using chaotic Chebyshev polynomials, and suggested an alternative implementation by
means of some generalised Chebyshev maps (see [31] and [22]), termed Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev
Rational Maps in [22].
Our Contribution. We start by analysing the public-key cryptosystem based on Chaos Theory,
described in [21], which uses Chebyshev polynomials. We show that such a cryptosystem, even if
efficient and practical, unfortunately, is not secure. Indeed, we describe an attack that permits to
recover the corresponding plaintext from a given ciphertext. The same attack can be applied to
produce forgeries if the cryptosystem is used for signing messages. We also consider a realization
of the cryptosystem on the Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps. We show that the attack
works against this cryptosystem as well. Then, we point out that also other primitives, a Diffie-
Hellman like key agreement scheme [32] and an authentication scheme [37], designed along the same
lines of the cryptosystem, are not secure due to the aforementioned attack. We close the paper by
discussing the main issues concerning with the design and the implementation of public key systems
that work on real numbers, summarising our results, and outlining some possible research directions.
3
2 Chebyshev Polynomials
In this section we briefly describe Chebyshev polynomials, since they represent the cornerstone on
which the public key cryptosystem, described in [21], and the authentication scheme, described in
[37], are built.
Definition 2.1 Let n be an integer, and let x be a variable taking value over the interval [−1, 1].
The polynomial Tn(x) : [−1, 1]→ [−1, 1] is recursively defined as
Tn(x) = 2 · x · Tn−1(x)− Tn−2(x), for any n ≥ 2,
where T0(x) = 1 and T1(x) = x.
Some examples of Chebyshev polynomials are (see Fig. 1):
T2(x) = 2 · x2 − 1
T3(x) = 4 · x3 − 3 · x
T4(x) = 8 · x4 − 8 · x2 + 1
Figure 1: Chebyshev polynomials
One of the most important properties of Chebyshev polynomials is the so called semi-group property
which establishes that:
Tr(Ts(x)) = Tr·s(x). (3)
An immediate consequence of this property is that Chebyshev polynomials commute under compo-
sition:
Tr(Ts(x)) = Ts(Tr(x)).
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3 A Cryptosystem based on Chebyshev Polynomials
A public key cryptosystem based on Chebyshev polynomials was proposed in [21]. It can be viewed
as a generalization of the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem [14].
3.1 The Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem is composed of three algorithms: a Key Generation algorithm, an Encryption
algorithm, and a Decryption algorithm.
Key Generation Algorithm. Key Generation takes place in three steps.
Alice, in order to generate the keys, does the following:
1. Generates a large integer s.
2. Selects a random number x ∈ [−1 , 1] and computes Ts(x).
3. Alice sets her public key to (x, Ts(x)) and her private key to s.
Encryption Algorithm. Encryption requires five steps:
Bob, in order to encrypt a message, does the following:
1. Obtains Alice’s authentic public key (x, Ts(x)).
2. Represents the message as a number M ∈ [−1 1].
3. Generates a large integer r.
4. Computes Tr(x), Tr·s(x) = Tr(Ts(x)) and X =M · Tr·s(x).
5. Sends the ciphertext C = (Tr(x), X) to Alice.
Decryption algorithm. Decryption requires two steps:
Alice, to recover the plaintext M from the ciphertext C, does the following:
1. Uses her private key s to compute Ts·r(x) = Ts(Tr(x)).
2. Recovers M by computing M = X/Ts·r(x).
3.2 Correctness of the Cryptosystem
The algorithm is correct due to the semi-group property of the Chebyshev polynomials. Indeed,
encryption provides:
X = M · Tr(Ts(x))
Since Chebyshev polynomials commute under composition, it follows that:
X = M · Ts(Tr(x))
Therefore:
M = X/Ts·r(x)
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3.3 Implementation
Both encryption and decryption involve the evaluation of Chebyshev polynomials. If we evaluate
Chebyshev polynomials directly, applying the recursive definition, then the computation of Tn(x)
takes linear time in n. However, it is possible to further reduce the computation to a logarithmic
number of steps [15], by noticing that
T2·n(x) = T2(Tn(x)),
T2·n+1(x) = 2 · Tn+1(x) · Tn(x)− x,
and re-organizing the computation. More precisely, we can use the recursive relation for evaluating
Chebyshev polynomials:
T0 = 1
T1 = x
Tn(x) =
{
2 · T 2n/2(x) − 1 if n is even
2 · T(n−1)/2(x) · T(n+1)/2(x)− x otherwise
Another important issue that must be considered when implementing the above cryptosystem is
the finite precision of the arithmetics. In [21] the authors pointed out that the semi-group property
of Chebyshev polynomials, stated by equation (3), holds only if the values s and r, chosen by Alice
and Bob, are such that s < s0 and r < r0, where s0 and r0 are constant values depending on the
arithmetics precision used in implementing the encryption and decryption algorithms. They gave
a table where, for certain precisions, expressed in terms of bits, some possible upper bound for s0
and r0 hold. For example, a 2048-bit precision implies constants s0 and r0 smaller than 2
970. Such
upper bounds where empirical determined. No general relation linking the arithmetic precision of
the operations to the values of s0 and r0 is currently known.
4 Security Analysis of the Cryptosystem
In this section we show that the above cryptosystem is not secure. Given a ciphertext an adversary,
by exploiting the same definition of Chebyshev polynomials and after some algebra, can recover the
cleartext.
In [21] it was presumed to be secure based on the following observation: as pointed out the scheme
resembles ElGamal encryption scheme. The security of ElGamal encryption scheme is based on the
intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in Z∗n, i.e., given n, x and x
p, find p. In the above
scheme, given x and Tp(x), the value Tp(x) is the value of a polynomial of order p, not just a power
xp. Hence, computing the order of the polynomial p, given only one pair (x, Tp(x)) seems to be much
harder than computing p from a power. Thus, recovering s given x and Ts(x) seems only possible
by computing Tp(x) for all p > 2 and, then, comparing for which p the equality Tp(x) = Ts(x) holds.
Unfortunately, there are some fundamental differences between the two schemes: ElGamal scheme
is implemented over Z∗n and uses modular arithmetic. Then, given x and x
p the discrete logarithm
is uniquely determined while, as we will show later, there are several Chebyshev polynomials passing
through the same point.
4.1 How to Recover the Plaintext
In this section we present an attack which enables an adversary to recover from a given ciphertext
the corresponding cleartext.
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First of all, we will use the trigonometric functions cos (x) and arccos (x) defined as
cos : R→ [−1, 1] and arccos : [−1, 1]→ [0, π].
The cos (x) function has period 2π.
Notice that Chebyshev polynomials can be alternatively defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 Let n be an integer, and let x be a variable taking value over the interval [−1, 1].
The polynomial Tn(x) : [−1, 1]→ [−1, 1] is defined as:
Tn(x) = cos(n · arccos(x)).
A simple trigonometric argument shows that Definition 2.1 and Definition 4.1 are equivalent.
Description of the Attack. Let (x, Ts(x)) be Alice’s public key. In order to encrypt a message
M , Bob chooses a large integer r and computes:
Tr(x), Tr·s(x) = Tr(Ts(x)), and X =M · Tr·s(x)
Then, he sends the cipher-text C = (Tr(x), X) to Alice.
Unfortunately an adversary, given Alice’s public key (x, Ts(x)) and the ciphertext (Tr(x), X),
can recover M as follows:
The adversary, to get the message, does the following:
1. Computes an r′ such that Tr ′(x) = Tr(x).
2. Evaluates Tr′s(x) = Tr′(Ts(x)).
3. Recovers M = XTr′s(x)
.
The attack is always successful because, if r ′ is such that Tr′(x) = Tr(x), then:
Tr·s(x) = Ts·r(x)
= Ts(Tr(x)) = Ts(Tr ′(x))
= Ts·r ′(x) = Tr ′·s(x)
= Tr ′(Ts(x)).
Let us show how such an r′ can be computed. Let N be the set of natural numbers and let Z be
the set of integers. According to Definition 4.1, it holds that Tr(x) = cos(r · arccos(x)). Let
P =
{± arccos (Tr(x)) + 2kπ
arccos (x)
| k ∈ Z
}
.
Notice that some r ′ belonging to the set P might not be integers. However, the following result
shows that P contains all possible integers r′ defining polynomials Tr′(x) passing through Tr(x).
Lemma 4.2 For each pair (x, Tr(x)), the integer r
′ satisfies Tr ′(x) = Tr(x) if and only if r
′ ∈ P∩N .
Proof. Let r′ ∈ P ∩N . Assume that
r′ =
arccos (Tr(x)) + 2k
′π
arccos (x)
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for a certain k′. By using Definition 4.1, it holds that
Tr′(x) = cos (r
′ arccos (x))
= cos
(
arccos (Tr(x)) + 2k
′π
arccos (x)
· arccos (x)
)
= cos (arccos (Tr(x)) + 2k
′π)
= cos (arccos (Tr(x)))
= Tr(x).
Hence, if r′ ∈ P ∩N , then Tr′(x) = Tr(x). If r′ = − arccos (Tr(x))+2k
′π
arccos (x) we can apply exactly the same
argument.
On the other hand, assume that Tr′(x) = Tr(x) for a certain r
′ ∈ N . Then,
Tr′(x) = cos (r
′ arccos (x)) = Tr(x).
Applying the arccos function to both members, we get:
arccos (cos (r′ arccos (x))) = arccos (Tr(x)). (4)
Let y = arccos (w). Due to the equality cos (−β) = cos (β), for every angle β, and due to the
periodicity of the cos function, all angles β such that cos (β) = w are given by β = ±y + 2kπ, for
k ∈ Z. Therefore, identity (4) holds if and only if
r′ arccos (x) = ± arccos (Tr(x)) + 2k′π.
where k′ ∈ Z. Dividing both members by arccos (x), we get:
r′ =
± arccos (Tr(x)) + 2k′π
arccos (x)
i.e., r′ ∈ P ∩ N . Thus, the lemma holds. 
Using the above result, denoting by
a =
arccos (Tr(x))
arccos (x)
and b =
2π
arccos (x)
(5)
the adversary has to find an integer k ∈ Z and a positive integer u ∈ N solutions to one of the two
equations
a+ k · b = u or − a+ k · b = u (6)
given a and b.
Let (a mod 1) and (b mod 1) be the fractional parts of a and b. The actual problem becomes solving
(a mod 1) + k · (b mod 1) = z
or
−(a mod 1) + k · (b mod 1) = z.
How to find k in a real implementation. Assume that we use a finite precision implementation in base
B ≥ 2, and that L is the maximum number of digits of (a mod 1) and (b mod 1). Then, multiplying
all terms by BL, we can rewrite the above equations in equivalent form as
(a mod 1) · BL + k · (b mod 1) · BL = z · BL
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and
−(a mod 1) · BL + k · (b mod 1) · BL = z ·BL.
Denoting by a′ the integer (a mod 1) ·BL and by b′ the integer (b mod 1) ·BL, the solutions to the
above equations are exactly the solutions to the linear modular equations
b′ · k ≡ a′ mod BL and b′ · k ≡ −a′ mod BL. (7)
However, notice that we can restrict our attention to just one of the above modular equations.
Indeed, since b′ · k ≡ −a′ mod BL is equivalent to b′ · (−k) ≡ a′ mod BL, once we have solved
b′ · k ≡ a′ mod BL, we easily derive the solutions to the second one. More precisely, if k is solution
to b′ · k ≡ a′ mod BL then BL − k is solution to b′ · k ≡ −a′ mod BL.
We can get efficiently the set of solutions to linear modular equations of the form b′k ≡ a′ mod BL
(see, for example, Chap. 33 of [9]). Denoting by < b′ >= {b′j mod BL|j ∈ ZBL} the subgroup of
elements of Z∗BL generated by b
′, it is easy to see that the modular equation has solutions if and
only if a′ ∈< b′ > . Moreover, denoting by d the gcd (b′, BL), the above membership condition is
equivalent to d|a′. The set of distinct solutions to b′k ≡ a′ mod BL (if there exist) has cardinality d
and is given by
xj = x0 + j · B
L
d
mod BL, for j = 1, . . . , d− 1,
where the first solution x0 can be obtained directly by applying the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
Indeed, such an algorithm, on input (b′, BL), outputs a triple (d, s′, t′) of integers where d = b′s′ +
BLt′, and it is easy to check that x0 = s
′ a′
d is solution to b
′k ≡ a′ mod BL. From a computational
point of view, the above procedure is efficient since the running time of the Extended Euclidean
Algorithm requires O(logBL) steps in the worst case.
Coming back to our setting, notice that the equations given in (7) have solutions by construction.
More precisely, there are exactly d = gcd (b′, BL) distint solutions for each of them, which can be
easily found applying the above method. Clearly, just one solution suffices to the adversary’s goal.
4.2 An Example
We show how an adversary, given Alice’s public key (x, Ts(x)) and the ciphertext C = (Tr(x), X),
where X =M · Trs(x), constructed by Bob in order to send M to Alice, computes the value Trs(x).
Then, dividing X by Trs(x), he recovers M .
Let us start by generating Alice’s public key parameters.
Let B = 10, π = 3.141592654, x = 0.64278761 and s = 106000. Then, arccos (x) = 518π, and
Ts(x) = cos (s · arccosx) = cos (106000 · 518π) = 0.173648178. Hence, Alice’s public key is given by
the pair
(x, Ts(x)) = (0.64278761, 0.173648178).
Assume that Bob, in order to encrypt a message M, chooses r = 81500. Then,
Tr(x) = cos (r · arccosx) = cos (81500 · 5
15
π) = −0.939692621,
and
Tr(Ts(x)) = cos (r · arccos (Ts(x))) = cos (81500 · 4
9
π) = 0.766044443.
By applying the strategy described before, an adversary computes an r′ such that Tr′(Ts(x) =
Tr(Ts(x)). Since it holds that
arccos (Tr(x)) =
8π
9
and arccos (x) =
5π
18
,
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the set of possible integer indices r′ is given by
P =
{± arccos (Tr(x))
arccos (x)
+
2πk
arccos (x)
| k ∈ Z
}
= {±3.2 + 7.2k | k ∈ Z} .
Hence, the adversary has to find a solution to one of the follwoing two equations
3.2 + 7.2k1 = u1 and − 3.2 + 7.2k2 = u2. (8)
where u1, u2 ∈ N . By considering only the fractional parts, the problem becomes solving one of
0.2 + 0.2k1 = z1, or − 0.2 + 0.2k2 = z2
where z1, z2 ∈ N . Since L = 1, then BL = 10, and the above equations are equivalent to
2 + 2k1 = 10z1 and − 2 + 2k2 = 10z2
whose solutions are exactly the solutions to the modular equations
2k ≡ 8 mod 10 and 2k ≡ 2 mod 10. (9)
Let us consider the first one. This equation has solutions since gcd (2, 10) = 2 and 2|8. Precisely,
there are 2 solutions, given by k = 4 + i5, for i = 0, 1, where 4 is the solution x0 obtained directly
by means of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm. By choosing one of them, for example 4, the
corresponding index r′, computed evaluating the first one of (8) is 32. Then, it holds that:
T32(Ts(x)) = cos (32 · 4
9
π) = 0.766044443.
Hence, the adversary has computed Trs(x). The cleartext sent by Bob is computed by the adversary
as X/T32s(x).
For completeness, notice the two solutions to the second equation are {6, 1} and are obtained by
computing −4 mod 10 and −9 mod 10. By choosing one of them, for example 1, the corresponding
index r′, computed evaluating the second of (8) is 4. Then, it holds that:
T4(Ts(x)) = cos (4 · 4
9
π) = 0.766044443.
Hence, the adversary has computed Trs(x). The cleartext sent by Bob is computed by the adversary
as X/T4s(x).
5 A Cryptosystem based on Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Ra-
tional Maps
As suggested in [21], instead of using Chebyshev polynomials, the cryptosystem we have previously
analised can be also realized by using the Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps, studied in
[31] and [22]. In the following subsections we show how to implement such a cryptosystem. Then,
we show that the attack we have identified for the cryptosystem based on Chebyshev polynomials
applies to this cryptosystem as well.
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5.1 Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps
The Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps are rational functions defined as follows [22]:
Definition 5.1 Let p be a positive integer, let ω ∈ [−1, 1] be a real number, and let k ∈ [0, 1] be a
real number called modulus. Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps are defined by
Rp+1(ω, k) =
2ω
1− k2(1−Rp(ω, k)2)(1 − ω2)Rp(ω, k)−Rp−1(ω, k),
where R0(ω, k) = 1 and R1(ω, k) = ω.
Notice that, when the modulus k = 0, the Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Map Rp(ω, 0)
is exactly a Chebyshev polynomial, i.e., Rp(ω, 0) = Tp(ω).
Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps enjoy the semi-group property. Indeed, for each
integers r, s ≥ 2, and for each ω, k, it holds that
Rr(Rs(ω, k), k) = Rr·s(ω, k). (10)
Hence, these maps commute under composition, i.e.,
Rr(Rs(ω, k), k) = Rs(Rr(ω, k), k).
5.2 The Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem is composed of three algorithms: a Key Generation algorithm, an Encryption
algorithm, and a Decryption algorithm.
Key Generation Algorithm. Key Generation takes place in three steps:
Alice, in order to generate the keys, does the following:
1. Generates a large integer s.
2. Selects two random numbers ω ∈ [−1 , 1] and k ∈ [0, 1], and computes
Rs(ω, k).
3. Alice sets her public key to (ω, k,Rs(ω, k)) and her private key to s.
Encryption Algorithm. Encryption requires five steps:
Bob, in order to encrypt a message, does the following:
1. Obtains Alice’s authentic public key (ω, k,Rs(ω, k)).
2. Represents the message as a number M ∈ [−1 , 1].
3. Generates a large integer r.
4. Computes Rr(ω, k), Rr·s(ω, k) = Rr(Rs(ω, k), k), and X =M ·Rr·s(ω, k).
5. Sends the ciphertext C = (Rr(ω, k), X) to Alice.
Decryption Algorithm. Decryption requires two steps:
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Alice, to recover the plaintext M from the ciphertext C, does the following:
1. Uses her private key s to compute Rs·r(ω, k) = Rs(Rr(ω, k), k).
2. Recovers M by computing M = X/Rs·r(ω, k).
Notice that, the value of k, which defines the form of the map, could be the same for all users of
the system.
5.3 Correctness of the Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem is correct due to the semi-group property of the Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev
Rational Maps. Indeed, encryption provides:
X = M · Rr(Rs(ω, k), k)
Since the maps commute under composition, it follows that:
X = M ·Rs(Rr(ω, k), k).
Therefore:
M = X/Rs·r(ω, k).
5.4 Jacobian Elliptic Functions and Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational
Maps
Jacobian elliptic Chebyshev rational maps can be equivalently defined by means of the Jacobian
elliptic functions [22].
Let ω ∈ [−1, 1], let k ∈ [0, 1], and let ϕ ∈ [0, 2π] be the angle, referred to as the amplitude of ω,
defined by
ω =
∫ ϕ
0
dθ
(1− k2 · sin2(θ)) 12 .
Then, the Jacobian elliptic functions sn(ω, k) and cn(ω, k) are defined as follows:
sn(ω, k) = sin(ϕ) and cn(ω, k) = cos(ϕ).
Let k′ =
√
1− k2. The above functions are doubly-periodic, having a real period and an imaginary
one. More precisely, denoting by
K =
∫ π
2
0
dθ
(1− k2 · sin2(θ)) 12 and iK
′
= i
∫ π
2
0
dθ
(1− k′2 · sin2(θ)) 12
where i is the imaginary unit, we get that sn(ω, k) has periods 4K and 2iK
′
; while cn(ω, k) has
periods 4K and 2K + 2iK
′
. We restrict our attention to the real periodicity.
For any fixed k, the function cn−1(v, k), inverse of the Jacobian elliptic function cn(ω, k), rela-
tively to the interval [0, 2K], is given by:
cn−1(v, k) =
∫ ϕ
0
dθ
(1− k2 sin2 (θ)) 12 .
where ϕ = arccos (v).
Then, we can state the following alternative definition for the Jacobian elliptic Chebyshev rational
maps:
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Definition 5.2 Let p ≥ 2 be an integer, let k ∈ [0, 1] be a real number, and let ω ∈ [−1, 1]. The
Jacobian elliptic Chebyshev rational maps with modulus k are defined by
Rp(ω, k) = cn(p · cn−1(ω, k), k).
5.5 Efficient Computation of cn(ω, k), sn(ω, k), and cn−1(v, k),
The functions cn(ω, k), sn(ω, k), and cn−1(v, k), all defined in terms of elliptic integrals, can be
efficiently computed by means of the Arithmetic-Geometric Method, (A.G.M. method, for short).
Roughly speaking, such a method works as follows: starting with (a0, b0), it proceeds to determine
number triples
(a1, b1, c1), (a2, b2, c2), . . . , (an, bn, cn)
according to the following scheme of arithmetic and geometric mean:
aj+1 =
1
2
(aj + bj) bj+1 = (aj · bj) 12 and cj+1 = 1
2
(aj − bj).
Assume that we use an arithmetic in base B with N -digit precision of the operations. The
procedure stops at the n-th step when an = bn, i.e., when cn = 0. Notice that such an equality
is achieved when the relative error ǫn = 1 − bnan is less than the degree of accurancy fixed by the
implementation i.e., B−N . It has been estimated (see, for example [33]) that the relative error
ǫj = 1 − bjaj decays approximatively as ǫj ≈ 18e−2
j
, from which it easily follows that the method
converges after roughly logN steps.
To compute the functions cn(ω, k) and sn(ω, k), we apply the A.G.M method starting with a0 =
1, and b0 = k
′. Once the A.G.M method stops, we compute the angle (in degrees) φn = 2
nanω
180
π .
Then, applying, for j = n, . . . , 1, the recurrence relation sin (2φj−1 − φj) = cjaj sinφj , we compute
the angles φn−1, φn−2, . . . , φ0. Finally,
sn(ω, k) = sinφ0 and cn(ω, k) = cosφ0.
On the other hand, to evaluate cn−1(v, k), for j = 0, . . . , n−1, by applying the recurrence relation
tan (γj+1 − γj) = bjaj tan γj , where γ0 = ϕ, we compute the angles γ1, . . . , γn, and then
cn−1(v, k) =
γn
2nan
.
Notice that the quarter-period K can be easily computed as well, since it is a special case of the
computation of cn(ω, k) (just set the angle ϕ = π/2). The reader is referred to [1] for further details
on the A.G.M method, and on the computation of sn(ω, k), cn(ω, k), and cn−1(v, k). Moreover, an
efficient implementation of the above functions can be found in [34].
6 Security Analysis of the Cryptosystem
Apart the complexity of the mathematical objects we are dealing with, the attack we have applied
against the public key scheme based on Chebyshev polynomials still works against the cryptosystem
based on Jacobian elliptic Chebyshev rational maps.
6.1 How to Recover the Plaintext
Let (ω, k,Rs(ω, k)) be Alice’s public key. In order to encrypt a message M , Bob chooses a large
integer r and computes:
Rr(ω, k), Rr·s(ω, k) = Rr(Rs(ω, k), k), and X =M ·Rr·s(ω, k)
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Then, he sends the ciphertext C = (Rr(ω, k), X) to Alice.
Unfortunately an adversary, given Alice’s public key (ω, k,Rs(ω, k)) and the ciphertext C =
(Rr(ω, k), X), can recover M as follows:
The adversary, to get the message, does the following:
1. Computes an r′ such that Rr ′(ω, k) = Rr(ω, k).
2. Evaluates Rr′s(ω, k) = Rr′(Rs(ω, k), k).
3. Recovers M = XRr′s(ω,k)
.
The attack is always successful because, if r ′ is such that Rr′(ω, k) = Rr(ω, k), then:
Rr·s(ω, k) = Rs·r(ω, k) = Rs(Rr(ω, k), k) = Rs(Rr ′(ω, k), k)
= Rs·r ′(ω, k) = Rr ′·s(ω, k) = Rr ′(Rs(ω, k), k).
Let us show how such an r′ can be computed. According to Definition 5.2, it holds
Rr(ω, k) = cn(r · cn−1(ω, k), k).
Hence, applying the cn−1 function to both members of the equality, and using the periodicity of
cn(ω, k) and the property cn(ω, k) = cn(−ω, k), we get that
±cn−1((Rr(ω, k), k) + z · 4K = r · cn−1(ω, k),
for z ∈ Z. Notice that we are only considering the real periodicity, since we are not interested in
imaginary solutions. Let
P =
{±cn−1(Rr(ω, k), k) + z · 4K
cn−1(ω, k)
| z ∈ Z
}
We can show that P contains all possible integers r′ defining maps Rr′(ω, k) passing through
Rr(ω, k), for certain r, ω, and k. The proof proceeds along the same lines of the proof provided
for Lemma 1. We omit it since it is essentially the same.
Lemma 6.1 For each triple (ω, k,Rr(ω, k)), the integer r
′ satisfies Rr ′(ω, k) = Rr(ω, k) if and only
if r′ ∈ P ∩ N .
Setting a = cn
−1(Rr(ω,k),k)
cn−1(ω,k) and b =
4K
cn−1(ω,k),k) as in (5), we apply exactly the same steps we
have done in Subsection 4.1 describing the attack against the cryptosystem based on Chebyshev
polynomials. Hence, an adversary can recover the plaintext from the ciphertext.
6.2 An Example
We show how an adversary, given Alice’s public key (ω, k,Rs(ω, k)) and the ciphertext C =
(Rr(ω, k), X), where X = M · Rrs(ω, k), constructed by Bob in order to send M to Alice, com-
putes the value Rrs(ω, k). Then, dividing X by Rrs(ω, k), he recovers M .
Let us start by generating Alice’s public key parameters.
Let B = 10, ω = 0.435946, k = 0.3, and s = 2342. Then, Rs(ω, k) = cn(s · cn−1(ω, k), k) =
0.245756. Hence, Alice’s public key is given by the triple
(ω, k,Rs(ω, k)) = (0.435946, 0.3, 0.245756).
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Assume that Bob, in order to encrypt a message M, chooses r = 1876. Then,
Rr(ω, k) = cn(r · cn−1(ω, k), k) = −0.938538
and
Rr(Rs(ω, k), k) = cn(r · cn−1(Rs(ω, k), k), k) = 0.613408.
By applying the strategy described in Subsection 6.1, an adversary computes an r′ such that
Rr′(Rs(ω, k), k) = Rr(Rs(ω, k), k). The set of possible integer indices r
′ is given by
P =
{±cn−1(Rr(ω, k), k) + z · 4K
cn−1(ω, k)
| z ∈ Z
}
= {±2.6 + 5.8k | k ∈ Z} .
Hence, the adversary has to find a solution to one of the follwoing two equations
2.6 + 5.8k1 = u1 and − 2.6 + 5.8k2 = u2. (11)
where u1, u2 ∈ N . By considering only the fractional parts, the problem becomes solving one of
0.6 + 0.8k1 = z1, or − 0.6 + 0.8k2 = z2
where z1, z2 ∈ N . Since L = 1, then BL = 10, and the above equations are equivalent to
6 + 8k1 = 10z1 and − 6 + 8k2 = 10z2
whose solutions are exactly the solutions to the modular equations
8k ≡ 4 mod 10 and 8k ≡ 6 mod 10. (12)
Let us consider the first one. This equation has solutions since gcd (8, 10) = 2 and 2|4. Precisely,
there are 2 solutions, given by k = 3 + i5, for i = 0, 1, where 3 is the solution x0 obtained directly
by means of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm. By choosing one of them, for example 3, the
corresponding index r′, computed evaluating the first one of (11) is 20. Then, it holds that:
R20(Rs(ω, k), k) = cn(20 · cn−1(Rs(ω, k), k), k) = 0.613408.
Hence, the adversary has computed Rrs(ω, k). The cleartext sent by Bob is computed by the adver-
sary as X/R20s(ω, k).
7 Key Agreement by using Rational Maps
Rational maps enjoying the semi-group property can be also used to design a Diffie-Hellman like key
agreement scheme. Umeno [32] was the first author who suggested such a method.
Let us briefly recall the following definitions, given in [25].
Definition 7.1 Key establishment is any process whereby a shared secret key becomes available to
two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic use.
Definition 7.2 A key agreement protocol or mechanism is a key establishment technique in which
a shared secret is derived by two or more parties as a function of information contributed by, or
associated with, each of these, ideally such that no party can predetermine the resulting value.
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Let us look at the following key agreement protocol:
Let X be a public real value, and let F (·, ·) be a rational map enjoying the semi-group property, i.e.,
F (p, F (q,X)) = F (pq,X).
Bob, in order to agree on a common key with Alice, does the following:
1. Generates a large integer p.
2. Computes Y = F (p,X).
3. Sends Y to Alice.
Alice, in order to agree on a common key with Bob, does the following:
1. Generates a large integer q.
2. Computes Y
′
= F (q,X).
3. Sends Y
′
to Bob.
Then, Alice and Bob compute the common value
Z = F (q, Y ) = F (q, F (p,X)) = F (p, F (q,X)) = F (p, Y
′
).
It is easy to check that if the rational map used in the above scheme is a Chebyshev Polynomial
or a Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational map then, since X is public and F (p,X) and F (q,X) are
sent in clear over the channel, an adversary who taps the channel, with no knowledge of the secret
values p and q, can employ the same attack we have described before for the public-key cryptosystem,
and compute the common key.
8 Entity Authentication based on Chebyshev Polynomials
Chebyshev Polynomials have also been used to design an authentication scheme. Entity authenti-
cation is defined as follows [25]:
Definition 8.1 Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured (through acqui-
sition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that
the second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time evidence is
acquired).
In [37] a scheme based on Chebyshev Polynomials, by means of which a user can efficiently
authenticate himself to a server in order to log in, was proposed. It strongly resembles the public
key cryptosystem described in [21]. Apart minor implementation details, the scheme works as follows:
Let m ∈ [−1, 1] be a real value, and denote by T is(·) the map Ts(·) iterated i times, i.e., T is(·) =
Ts(Ts(Ts . . . Ts(·)) . . .) = Tsi(·).
16
Setup Phase - Server Side
1. The server generates a random number r.
2. Computes and sends Tr(m) to the user.
Setup Phase - User Side
1. The user chooses a random number s.
i-th Authentication Phase
1. The user computes T is(m), and auth = T
i
s(Tr(m)), and sends both values to
the server.
2. The server computes auth
′
= Tr(T
i
s(m)) and checks whether auth = auth
′
.
Then, if the check is satisfied, the access is granted.
It is easy to see that, if m and Tr(m) are public, an adversary who gets the messages associated
with the first log in request, can apply the same attack we have described before in order to get
an integer s′ such that Ts′(m) = Ts(m). Then, at the i-th session, he can authenticate himself as
the real user by computing T is′(m), and auth = T
i
s′(Tr(m)). Indeed, it is easy to show, arguing by
induction on i, that T is′(m) = T
i
s(m). Therefore, it holds that
auth = T is′(Tr(m)) = Tr(T
i
s′(m)) = Tr(T
i
s(m)) = T
i
s(Tr(m)) = auth
′
.
Thus, the scheme is not secure. One way to avoid the above attack is to make m and Tr(m) private
to the user and the server. Unfortunately, the scheme is not secure even if m and Tr(m) are private.
Indeed, even in this scenario, an adversary with no knowledge of the private valuesm and Tr(m), who
just listen to two consecutive authentication phases, can subsequently authenticate himself to the
server as it were the real user. More precisely, assume that the adversary gets T i−1s (m), T
i−1
s (Tr(m))
and T is(m), T
i
s(Tr(m)). Then, the attack works as follows:
The adversary does the following:
1. Computes an integer w such that Tw(T
i−1
s (m)) = T
i
s(m).
2. For any ℓ ≥ 1, to autheticate himself at the (i+ ℓ)-th session,
(a) Computes
T i+ℓs (m) = T
ℓ
w(T
i
s(m)) and auth = T
i+ℓ
s (Tr(m)) = T
ℓ
w(T
i
s(Tr(m))).
(b) Sends the pair (T i+ℓs (m), auth).
Notice that the adversary does not need to know the index i of the session. He just needs two
consecutive authentication messages.
In order to understand why the attack works, notice that an integer w such that Tw(Tsi−1(m)) =
Tsi(m) can be computed by applying the same attack we have described before against the cryp-
tosystem. Then, we can proceed by induction on ℓ to show that T i+ℓs (m) = T
ℓ
w(T
i
s(m)) and
auth = T i+ℓs (Tr(m)) = T
ℓ
w(T
i
s(Tr(m))).
Let ℓ = 1. It is easy to see that
Ts
i+1(m) = Ts(Tsi(m)) = Ts(Tw(Tsi−1(m))) = Tw(Ts(Tsi−1(m))) = Tw(Tsi(m)).
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Then, notice that Tw(Tsi−1(Tr(m))) = Tsi(Tr(m)). Indeed,
Tw(Tsi−1(Tr(m))) = Tw(Tr(Tsi−1(m))) = Tr(Tw(Tsi−1(m))) = Tr(Tsi(m)) = Tsi(Tr(m)).
Therefore,
Ts
i+1(Tr(m)) = Ts(Tsi(Tr(m))) = Ts(Tw(Tsi−1(Tr(m)))) = Tw(Ts(Tsi−1(Tr(m))) = Tw(Tsi(Tr(m))).
Assume that
Tsi+(ℓ−1)(m) = Tw(ℓ−1)(Tsi(m)) and Tsi+(ℓ−1)(Tr(m)) = Tw(ℓ−1)(Tsi(Tr(m))).
By applying the inductive hypothesis, it holds that
Tsi+ℓ(m) = Ts(Tsi+(ℓ−1)(m)) = Ts(Tw(ℓ−1)(Tsi(m))) = Ts(Tw(ℓ−1)(Tw(Tsi−1(m)))) = Twℓ(Tsi(m)),
and
Tsi+ℓ(Tr(m)) = Ts(Tsi+(ℓ−1)(Tr(m))) = Ts(Tw(ℓ−1)(Tsi(Tr(m))))
= Ts(Tw(ℓ−1)(Tw(Tsi−1(Tr(m)))))
= Twℓ(Tsi(Tr(m))).
Thus, the attack works.
9 Public Key Cryptosystems on Real Numbers
Currently used public key cryptosystems are defined over finite fields and use modular arithmetics.
Their security is often based on the difficulty of solving certain number theoretic problems, such as
factoring large composite integers, computing the discrete logarithm in finite multiplicative groups,
deciding quadratic residuosity, computing square roots, and so on. In other words, they are designed
in such a way that the cryptosystem can be broken if the presumed underlying difficult problem
becomes easy to solve. At the moment, this method cannot be applied to realize chaos-based
cryptosystems, since they are defined over real numbers.
Certainly two important issues must be solved in order to design a secure public key cryptosystem
based on real numbers. In order to apply a reductionistic approach, some presumed difficult problem
over the field of real numbers which permits implementing some one-way trapdoor function or
permutation should be identified. Moreover, as the above attack in a certain way points out, the
finite representation of real numbers in a computer with finite memory and the finite precision of the
operations, performed by such a machine, deserve an in-depth study in order to well understand the
implications in terms of security they give rise to. Paradoxically, it might also exist a good technique
for implementing a secure cryptosystem over the infinite field of real numbers which turns out to be
insecure for any finite implementation over a finite computer using a finite arithmetic precision.
Some studies dealing with the possibility of cryptographic primitives over nonclassical computa-
tional models have already been done. For example, in [7], the possibility of secret sharing schemes
[4, 27] over infinite countable domains, like the set of all binary strings, was studied. It was shown
that no such a scheme exist. Later on, in [8], the case of private computations over the integers
was studied, and it was shown that some lower bounds that hold in the finite case do not extend to
infinite domains. Recently, in [36], Cryptography over the infinite field of rational numbers, giving
all parties unbounded computational power, has been considered. Under the assumption that users
can sample random real numbers, and that standard field operations can be used, it turned out
that secure signature and secure encryption do not exist. As well as, Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
oblivious transfer, and interactive encryption.
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10 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this paper we have analysed a public key cryptosystem based on Chebyshev polynomials. Unfor-
tunately, even if it is efficient and based on a fascinating and elegant idea, we have shown that it
is not secure, since an adversary can efficiently recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext. The
proposed cryptosystem can be implemented by using any chaotic map xn+1 = Fp(xn) for which
F can be written as Fp(x) = f(p · f−1(x)), and such that Fp(Fs(x)) = Fp·s(x), i.e., it enjoys the
semi-group property. Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps represent another class of maps
enjoying such a property. We have shown that the attack described in Section 5 can still be applied
if these maps are used. Moreover, we have analysed a Diffie-Hellman like key agreement scheme
based on rational maps and we have pointed out that if Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational Maps
are used, then the scheme is not secure, in the sense that a passive adversary can compute the
common key. Finally, we have also shown that a recently proposed authentication scheme, designed
along the same lines of the public key cryptosystem, is still subject to our attack and, hence, it is
not secure. The attack we have described works in every case in which the maps Fp(x) enjoy the
semi-group property, and given x and Fp(x), it can be efficiently computed an integer solution p
′
to the equation Fp′(x) = Fp(x). However, a detailed study of new implementations as well as the
design and investigation of other chaos-based public key systems are interesting topics for future
researches.
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